Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The Government on 8.10.1996 passed an order in pursuance of the direction given by the High Court rejecting the application of the applicant, same was challenged after inordinate delay i.e. on 27.4.2003 ..

Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The Government on 8.10.1996 passed an order in pursuance of the direction given by the High Court rejecting the application of the applicant, same was challenged after inordinate delay i.e. on 27.4.2003 by the writ petitioner, therefore, the writ petition was hopelessly belated. [Para 8] [582-A-B] 1.2. The High Court has rightly affirmed the objection of the respondents. When the application of the writ petitioner under Rule 39 was rejected on 8.10.1996 by the State Government pursuant to the direction given by the High Court, the writ petitioner waited up to 27.4.2003 and filed a belated writ petition. But strangely enough, the writ petition was entertained and an interim order was passed and it was not interfered despite the State Government raising an objection. It was only when the third party who felt aggrieved by the said interim order because the writ petitioner on account of this interim order started interfering with his area, that the matter was entertained by the High Court and it was clubbed up together. There was no justification for the writ petitioner to have waited for a long time. Once the order was passed on 8.10.1996, then there was no need for the writ petitioner to have waited for such a long time. Thus, Court is in full agreement with the view taken by the High Court. However, the High Court despite the fact that the writ petition was belated and suffered from laches entered into the controversy on the merits also and took the view that when Rule 39 was deleted within four weeks of the direction to the State Government to dispose of the application of the writ petitioner, there was no option with the Collector but to reject the application as the rule which was in force was repealed, therefore, the basis on which the order was passed was knocked out. Therefore, the High Court declined to grant any relief to the writ petitioner and dismissed the writ petition on merit also. [Para 8] [582-B-E] 1.3 So far as the question of delay is concerned, no hard and first rule can be laid down and it will depend on the facts of each case. In the present case, the facts stare at the face of it that on 8.10.1996 an order was passed by the Collector pursuant to the order passed by the High Court, rejecting the application of writ petitioner for consideration of the grant of mining lease. The writ petitioner sat tight over the matter and did not challenge the same up to 2003. This is on the face of it appears to be very serious. A person who can sit tight for such a long time or no justifiable reason, cannot be given any benefit. [Para 11] [583-E-F] Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. AND ANOTHER v. Dolly Das, [1999] 4 SCC 450 and M/s. Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur AND OTHERS etc., [1992] 2 SCC 598, relied on. 1.4. Rule 39 of the Rules was already repealed on 27.6.1996 and the ground reality had also changed. So far as grant of mining and mineral lease is concerned, no person has a vested right in it. There is no quarrel on the legal proposition that if certain rights have been decided on the basis of the law which was obtaining at that time, that will not nullify the judicial decision unless the bases are taken out. In the present case, the rule under which the writ petitioner sought direction for consideration of his application has already been repealed within the time frame directed by the High Court. Therefore the basis on which the order was passed has been totally knocked out. Rule 39 on the basis of which direction was given was not in existence. Therefore, it could not have been possible for the authorities to have acceded to the request of the writ petitioner. More so, no one has a vested right in mineral lease. [Para 13] [584-E-G] State of Tamil Nadu v. M/s. Hind Stone AND OTHERS, [1981] 2 SCC 205 and P.T.R. Exports (Madras) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1996] 5 SCC 268, relied on. K. Subramanian, E.C. Agrawala, Mahesh Agarwal, Rishi Agrawala, Varun Mathur, Gaurav Goel and Neha Aggarwal for the Appellant. K.K. Mani and R. Nedumaran for the Respondents.

Judges note that not only has work been assigned but considerable work has been done according to respondents, though that factor alone would not suffice as we had made clear vide our interims orders that the respondent No.3 would have to meet the..

Judges note that not only has work been assigned but considerable work has been done according to respondents, though that factor alone would not suffice as we had made clear vide our interims orders that the respondent No.3 would have to meet the benchmark of the eligibility norms and any work done was at its risk and cost. 21. We are, thus, of the view that the tendering process in question does not call for any interference in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as there is no arbitrariness, illegality or perversity involved in the same. On the other hand, the concerned authorities have duly verified the experience of respondent No.3 and, undisputedly, the financial terms are the best as offered by respondent No.3. 22. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.